Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts by Schauer, Frederick
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1981
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
Three Acts
Frederick Schauer
Copyright c 1981 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Schauer, Frederick, "Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts" (1981). Faculty Publications. Paper 876.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/876
Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts 
Frederick Schauer* 
I. PROLOGUE: THE CoNcEPT OF CATEGORY 
Categories are the tools of systematic thinking.1 They enable 
us to organize our ideas, to draw analogies, and to make distinc-
tions. In this respect categories are important in law because they 
are important in life. Categories, however, have a special promi-
nence in legal reasoning, to a great extent because effective reason-
ing by example requires the creation and use of categories through 
which the lessons of the past can be channelled into service as pre-
cedent for the problems of :the future. Legal rules not only pre-
scribe results, but they also create (or recognize) the categories of 
conduct to which the rules apply. Without categories there could 
be no rules.:• 
All of this no doubt appears trivially true. Yet it is necessary 
to state the obvious, for failure to recognize the importance of cat-
egories, or failure to appreciate the importance of categorization, 
can and has led to the kind of platitudinous overgeneralization 
that is inconsistent with tight legal reasoning. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in first amendment adjudication, in which the 
term "categorization" has unfortunately been used to refer to a 
specific technique of first amendment analysis, a technique most 
often presented as an alternative to "balancing."8 Casting first 
* Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 1968, 
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard University. 
1. The philosophical orientation of some of this Article cautions me to point out here 
that throughout this Article I am using the word "category" in its ordinary and not its 
technical philosophical sense. I am not suggesting that the categories of which I speak are in 
some metaphysical way ultimate or fundamental. 
2. Cf. Frantz, Is The First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 
CALIF. L. REv. 729, 750 (1963) (absoluteness in scope would render concept of a rule mean-
ingless). Those familiar with the nomenclature of rules will note that the protasis of a rule, 
a necessary part of any rule, is that part that describes the category of facts to which the 
rule applies. See G. GOTI'LIEB, THE LoGic OF CHOICE 36, 43 (1968); W. TwiNING & D. MIERs, 
How To Do THINGS WITH RULES 51-55 (1976). 
3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERicAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 583-84, 602-05 (1978); Ely, Flag 
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amend-
265 
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amendment theory as a choice between these alternatives, how-
ever, masks the full importance of categories in the structure of 
first amendment doctrine. This problem is not alleviated by show-
ing, as Professor Ely has done,~ that categorization and balancing 
can be consistent and complementary, for even this approach fo-
cuses on but one aspect of the way in which categories are relevant 
to free speech problems. 
I would thus like to cast aside any preconceptions about cate-
gorization as a first amendment technique and look instead at the 
way in which thinking about categories in general can help us to 
think clearly about a number of hard problems in first amendment 
methodology. One pervasive difficulty is that the term "categoriza-
tion" is in this context ambiguous, since at least three distinct as-
pects of first amendment theory can be and have been referred to 
as "categorization." These three aspects of categorization, although 
separate, are related in an important and logical way. They are like 
three acts of the same play, and they provide the foundation for 
the tripartite structure of this Article. 
It is in no way my intention to build a new theory of the first 
amendment. We have too many of those already.15 I want only to 
look at the first amendment through a different window. From that 
ment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Farber, Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727,746-47 (1980); Karst, Equality as a Cen-
tral Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 31 n.55 (1975). 
4. Ely, supra note 3, at 1501. See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 111 (1980). 
5. See, e.g., every third article or student note in every other issue of any law review 
selected at random. Frivolity aside, however, there have been major advances in first 
amendment theory in recent years, and we no longer preoccupy ourselves with debating the 
merits of "absolutism" and "balancing," at least not in the same naive way we did in the 
1950s and 1960s. Although the structure of the first amendment is in large part dependent 
on its substantive underpinnings, it is still useful to note that some modern theorizing has 
concerned itself largely with the structure of first amendment doctrine. See, e.g., L. TiuBE, 
supra note 3, at 576-605; Ely, supra note 3; Farber, supra note 3; Fuchs, Further Steps 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 347 (1976); 
Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FoUNDATION REsEARcH J. 645; Karst, supra 
note 3; Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915 (1978). Other theorizing has been concerned with the equally impor-
tant task of ascertaining the substantive underpinnings of the concept of free speech, with-
out which it is impossible to develop a first amendment structure. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of 
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.CL.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); BeVier, The 
First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of 
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment 
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FoUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity 
Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Scan-
lon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972). 
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window we may see things we have not seen before, or at least see 
more clearly that which we have heretofore only dimly perceived. 
If others wish then to look through this same window in order to 
erect new theories of the first amendment, structural or substan-
tive,8 I cannot stop them, but theory-building is beyond my pre-
sent aims. 
II. AcT ONE: THE QUEsTION oF CoVERAGE 
Not every case is a first amendment case. This is hardly a con-
troversial observation, but it reveals that the first amendment is 
itself a category, or, more accurately, that it covers a category of 
behavior. The boundaries of this category are frequently contested, 
and they are unclear even when there is general agreement as to 
broad principles. Yet the first amendment constrains only some 
governmental ends, and only some governmental means. It is not a 
universal prohibition on governmental action, and if it is to mean 
anything at all some boundary must circumscribe its coverage, 
however fuzzy that boundary may be.7 Thus, only a certain cate-
gory of behavior is covered by the first amendment. It can there-
fore be helpful to look at the question of first amendment coverage 
as a category question: What marks off the category covered by the 
first amendment from those other categories of conduct that do 
not implicate free speech analysis? 
Fortunately, the text of the first amendment gives some gui-
dance in locating the boundaries of the category, but the guidance 
is relatively indeterminate. It would be more accurate to say that 
the text circumscribes the range of judicial choice rather than that 
it mandates any particular decision.8 The text gives few answers to 
many difficult questions, in part because of the complexity of the 
concept of free speech, in part because the language employed is 
both vague and ambiguous,9 and in part because of the diversity 
6. See note 5 supra. 
7. Frantz, supra note 2, at 750. See also Bork, supra note 5, at 21; Schauer, Speech 
and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitu-
tional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 902-19 (1979). 
8. See Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA. 
L. REv. 637, 656 (1961). See also Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. 
L. REv. 407 (1950). 
9. Anyone who thinks that the language of the first amendment is precise, unambigu-
ous, or self-defining has not examined it closely. It is undeniably strong, but it is far from 
clear. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 88 (1962); J. ELY, supra note 4, at 105; 
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. 
L. REv. 821 (1962); Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment as Ordi-
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and continuing novelty of free speech problems. 
The first amendment says that "Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . . "10 The substantive con-
tent marked off by this language is different from that which 
would be marked off by a first amendment that substituted, for the 
word "speech," the words "action," "travel," "property," or "con-
tract.''11 In this respect we can begin by saying that, in an impor-
tant way, it is the category of "speech" that is set off by the first 
amendment for special protection. From this perspective it can be 
hypothesized that the act of categorization is the act of defining 
the word "speech." If the conduct at issue falls within that cate-
gory, then the second question is whether a given action by a state 
or by the federal government did or did not abridge the freedom to 
engage in the conduct demarcated by the category of "speech." 
This second question is of course complex and difficult, but it logi-
cally follows the first question of categorization, the question of 
whether the conduct at issue constitutes "speech." 
Delineating the category of "speech," determining what counts 
as "speech" for first amendment purposes, is implicit in every first 
amendment case. The question only comes to the surface, however, 
when the accepted or proposed category of "speech" diverges from 
the meaning of the word "speech" in ordinary language.lll Current 
obscenity doctrine is undoubtedly the most prominent example/* 
but we have in the past seen a similar approach in those decisions 
holding neither libel, u fighting words, 15 nor commercial advertis-
ing16 to be speech in the constitutional sense. It is not correct, how-
ever, to assume that the Supreme Court's rejection of the "non-
speech" treatment for libel/7 commercial advertising,I8 and (most 
nary Language, 87 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1973). 
10. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. I am intentionally excluding reference to or discussion of 
the Press Clause, although much of what is said here is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the 
Press Clause as well. 
11. See BeVier, supra note 5, at 321; Schauer, supra note 7, at 902-03. 
12. Schauer, supra note 7, at 905-10. 
13. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See generally F. ScHAUER, THE LAw 
OF OBSCENITY 30-48 (1976). 
14. Beauhamais v. illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
16. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). Beauharnais has never 
been specifically overruled, as Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White have noted. Smith 
v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Blackman, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Smith v. 
Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay). 
The holding, however, does seem to perish in, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
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probably) fighting words19 leaves obscenity all alone as the only 
conduct that would or might be speech in ordinary language but 
that is not speech in the eyes of the Constitution. It is just that 
most of the other examples are rarely if ever litigated. If the presi-
dent of manufacturer A suggests to the president of manufacturer 
B that they should both charge their customers X dollars per wid-
get, A's first amendment defense to a prosecution under the Sher-
man Act is nonexistent, despite the fact that everything that A has 
done would be considered speech in ordinary language. 
Examples like this highlight an important fork in the road in 
free speech theory. Is the category of speech to be congruent with 
the denotation of the ordinary meaning of the word "speech," or is 
the word "speech" in the first amendment to be defined as a piece 
of technical language, whose definition is derived from the under-
lying theory of the first amendment? This choice between the ordi-
nary language approach and the technical language approach is in 
turn contingent upon a more pervasive question of constitutional 
theory: Is constitutional language in general a form of technical 
language, to be interpreted in its unique context and with refer-
ence to its particular purposes, or is it ordinary language, to be 
interpreted by applying the ordinary language, or "dictionary," 
definitions of the terms it contains? It seems clear that only the 
former approach is defensible,20 but I do not wish to argue the 
point here. Rather, I want to explore the implications of the latter 
approach in the particular context of the first amendment, pro-
ceeding by the method of reductio ad absurdum; that is, what hap-
pens if we try to interpret the word "speech" in the first amend-
(per curiam), and the methodology also is belied in every defamation case from New York 
Times to the present. Some, however, have refused to attend the funeral. See, e.g., Arkes, 
Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 SUP. 
CT. REV. 281; Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979). 
18. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
u.s. 748 (1976). 
19. Although the Chaplinsky fighting words doctrine has never been explicitly repudi-
ated, the standard that emerges after Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and its prog-
eny indicates that the Court now employs a variant of the context-dependent "clear and 
present danger" test to determine the constitutionality of fighting words prosecutions. See 
Karst, supra note 3, at 31; Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 944 n.191. 
20. On legal language in general as a technical, context-dependent language, see e.g., 
G. GOTI'LIEB, supra note 2, at 48; J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 197-98 
(1947); Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 381, 395 (1941); Hart, 
Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAw Q. REV. 37 (1954); Stone, Ratiocination 
Not Rationalisation, 74 MIND 463 (1965). It may be that constitutional language ought to be 
interpreted more as ordinary language than is other legal language, but it will take some 
showing to convince me of that. 
270 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:265 
ment as meaning what it means in ordinary language-what it 
means to the "man in the street"?21 
If we do define "speech" by reference to Webster's dictionary, 
then many distinctly discordant cases would be considered first 
amendment cases, a circumstance occasioned by the pervasiveness 
of language (speech) in almost every facet of human activity. The 
antitrust example just mentioned is merely the tip of the iceberg. 
Not only do we fix prices with speech, but we also make contracts 
with speech, commit perjury with speech, discriminate with 
speech, extort with speech, threaten with speech, and place bets 
with speech.22 Is it possible to say that all of these cases and many 
more are covered by the first amendment? 
If we do say that all of these cases are covered by the first 
amendment, we then must have a way of holding that these activi-
ties are not protected by the first amendment23 unless of course we 
want to say that the first amendment makes, for example, all of 
contract law, most of antitrust law, and much of criminal law un-
constitutional. This distinction can be made without doing undue 
violence to the text by saying that the first amendment is not even 
in its language absolute-in other words, that the freedom or• 
speech does not encompass freedom to fix prices, breach contracts, 
make false warranties, place bets with bookies, threaten, extort, 
21. This approach is an expansion of the premise from which I have argued for the 
plausibility of the Court's "nonspeech" approach to obscenity. Schauer, supra note 7, at 
902-19. See also Schauer, Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 605 (1979). 
22. People have made first amendment claims in cases like these, but with predictably 
little success. See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980) (aiding and abetting tax evasion); United States v. Frederickson, 
601 F.2d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 934 (1980) (threatening President; 
application of Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)); United States v. Lincoln, 589 
F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1979) (threatening letter); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 
787 (3d Cir. 1978) (harassing telephone call). 
23. On the distinction between coverage and protection, see R. DwoRKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 260-61 (1977) ("force" and "range"); J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 80 
(1971) ("scope" and "incumbency"); BeVier, supra note 5, at 301 ("ambit" and "level"); 
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 
SUP. CT. REv. 267, 278 ("ambit" and "level"); Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" 
Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 SUP. CT. REv. 217, 227-29; Shiffrin, 
supra note 5, at 916 n.17 ("scope" and "level"). See also text accompanying notes 48-67 
infra. 
24. Taking "the freedom of speech" as the appropriate unit of coverage has tradition-
ally been the opening move of the "definers." See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND 
ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 19 (1948); Bork, supra note 5, at 21; Nimmer, The Right 
to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied 
to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 948 (1968). 
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and so on. But why doesn't it? It is not because these activities 
necessarily constitute something that looks like a clear and present 
danger or because the laws against such activity represent a com-
pelling governmental interest. Verbal gambling, for example, is 
commonly thought to be unpleasant and undesirable (at least by 
legislatures), but it is bizarre to say that verbal betting presents a 
clear and present danger or a compelling interest in a way that 
racial epithets, advocacy of violent revolution, and disclosure of 
confidential government documents do not. If no first amendment 
and principle of free speech existed, would we say that a telephone 
bookie operation constitutes a greater danger of harm than the 
march of the American Nazi Party in Skokie?25 I doubt it very 
much. 
The upshot of this is that a literalist (dictionary, or ordinary 
language) approach presents yet another choice. We must either 
water down the test for protection, leaving in doubt the extent of 
constitutional protection for Collin,28 Brandenburg,27 and for that 
matter Debs,28 or conclude that certain categories of speech are to 
25. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977) (Ste-
vens, J., as Circuit Justice, denying stay); National Socialist Party of America v. Village of 
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay 
denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally Goldberger, Skokie: 
The First Amendment Under Attack by Its Friends, 29 MERcER L. REv. 761 (1978). I am 
not, of course, suggesting that this means anything other than that it is impossible to under-
stand the principles of free speech unless we recognize that free speech principles protect 
certain acts despite the harm they may or do cause. See Schauer, supra note 21. 
26. See note 25 supra. Collin and the National Socialist Party of America announced 
plans to march in front of Village Hall in Skokie, Illinois, a Chicago suburb with a large 
Jewish population. In response, the Village enacted ordinances designed to prohibit the 
demonstration. The Seventh Circuit held that an ordinance prohibiting dissemination of 
materials that would promote hatred toward persons on the basis of their heritage was un-
constitutional and that a permit for the proposed march could not be denied on the basis of 
anticipated violations of the ordinance. 
27. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg, leader of a 
Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted of violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute after 
giving a speech in which he suggested the possibility that the Klan would take some 
"revengeance" in order to accomplish its supremacist goals. In overturning the conviction, 
the Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional because it punished "mere advocacy" 
and forbade "assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action." I d. at 
449. The Court stated that "the constitutional gnarantees of free speech and free press do 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447. 
28. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Debs, a leader of the Socialist Party, 
was convicted under the Espionage Act, based on an antiwar speech he had delivered. The 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury was warranted in finding that the speech 
went beyond the permissible bounds of the first amendment, having as its "natural and 
intended effect" the obstruction of recruiting for the armed forces. Id. at 215. 
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be tested under drastically different standards of protection. I 
would assume that this drastically different standard would be, for 
cases like antitrust law or contract law, identical to the minimal 
due process standard29 now used to evaluate the constitutionality 
of such legislation. 30 This conclusion is unavoidable, unless we wish 
to say that contract law needs greater justification than nonverbal 
tort law solely because contracts use words and automobile acci-
dents do not, a position quite difficult to defend. 
At this point in the argument the literalist brings out his mir-
rors. Certain verbal conduct such as extortion, the literalist will 
say, is covered by the first amendment because it is "speech" in 
the ordinary language sense; we will subject its constitutionality 
(protection) to lowest-level scrutiny, however, because it does not 
look like the kind of thing the first amendment is supposed to pro-
tect. Why, then, hold that it was covered in the first place? The 
easy answer is that we do not want judges "redefining" the words 
in the constitutional text. The next question is, of course, why, if 
judges should not redefine the terms in the text of the constitution, 
those same judges should determine that certain classes of admit-
tedly covered speech are subject to lowest-level scrutiny. I do not 
have an answer for that, and I doubt that the literalist does either. 
The literalist is forced by examples such as contract law to say that 
the heavier burden of justification implicit in the first amendment 
is reserved for a subcategory of verbal acts-which is exactly the 
same as saying that the word "speech" in the first amendment 
does not include all verbal acts. 
The literalist is presented with a parallel problem in refer-
ence to those acts that are not speech in the ordinary language 
sense but are speech in the constitutional sense-armband wear-
ing,31 communicative clothing,32 oil painting, political contribu-
29. See L. TRmE, supra note 3, at 577 n.S. 
30. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483 (1955). In reference to Ferguson, it is useful to reinforce the point made in the 
text by noting that it is very hard to adjust a debt without speaking. In fact, it is also quite 
difficult, albeit not impossible, to fit a pair of eyeglasses without using words. Maybe Lee 
Optical should have claimed first amendment protection for the printed eye chart. 
31. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). It would be interesting to explore the extent to which constitutional adjudication 
influences the development of ordinary language; that is, are people more likely to think of 
armbands as "speech" in ordinary talk now that they are speech for constitutional purposes. 
The same inight be hypothesized about flags after, for example, Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405 (1974). Ordinary language changes for innumerable reasons, and there is no reason 
to suppose that public knowledge of coustitutional doctrine is not among them. 
32. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970). 
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tions,33 photography, and so on. If these activities count as speech 
because they share relevant similarities with speech, then some at-
tributes of speech must serve to trigger the guarantees of the first 
amendment. If that is so, then some verbal acts may not share 
these attributes, and thus are not "speech" in the constitutional 
sense. What emerges from all of this is the conclusion that the con-
stitutional definition of the word "speech" carves out a category 
that is not coextensive with the ordinary language meaning of the 
word "speech."34 When we define the word "speech," we are cate-
gorizing. This occurs regardless of the source of the definition, and 
in this sense categorization is implicit in any approach to the the-
ory or structure of the first amendment. 
In considering the boundaries of the category covered by the 
first amendment, I have been looking somewhat unnaturally at the 
single word "speech." It is perhaps more sensible to look not at the 
word but at the phrase, asking whether a given act was included 
within "the freedom of speech."315 If that act were included, then it 
would be within the prohibition on abridgement, leaving for the 
second level of inquiry the question of what is an abridgement. 
Under this approach not every act of speech would be covered by 
the first amendment's prohibition on abridgement; only those acts 
that come within "the freedom of speech" would be covered. Here 
we substitute for the question, "What is speech?" the question, 
"What is 'the freedom of speech'?". 
In one respect this alternative technique produces no change, 
for "the freedom of speech" is not the same as "the freedom of 
action" or "the freedom of contract." This second approach col-
lapses into the first, for the initial question must still be, "What is 
'speech'?". It is this category question that comes first in any first 
amendment case, regardless of what happens with speech once it is 
found. We must always first ask, ""Is this speech?", regardless of 
whether we are going to determine thereafter if it is the type of 
speech that we deem to be free, protect absolutely, protect only 
strongly, or subject to a "balancing of the interests." 
In another respect, however, the question of whether to look at 
the word "speech" in isolation as opposed to looking at the entire 
33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is 
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
34. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the 
time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.). 
35. See note 24 supra. 
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phrase, "the freedom of speech," does produce an important dis-
tinction. In setting the boundaries of the category of conduct en-
compassed by the first amendment, those approaches commonly 
referred to as "definitional" combine close attention to defining 
the boundaries of the category with a desire to grant absolute pro-
tection within those boundaries. 88 The theories of Meiklejohn, 87 
Frantz,88 Emerson,89 and Nimmer;'0 for example, all define "the 
freedom of speech" in their own purpose-oriented way (with which 
there is nothing wrong41) and then argue that conduct falling 
within the contours of the category is absolutely protected. 
These "definitional-absolutist" theories treat all nonprotected 
speech identically. They treat especially harmful political speech 
("Go burn down the draft board-NOW!!," uttered in front of an 
angry mob of torchbearing antidraft protestors fifty yards from the 
draft board) the same way as extortion, contract law, and advice or 
encouragement in the commission of a nonpolitical bank robbery. 
If we look at the reasons for the exclusion of these utterances from 
first amendment protection, however, we see that especially harm-
ful political speech is excluded because of the extent and the im-
mediacy of the danger; discussing the wisdom of burning down 
draft boards at a peaceful teach-in is protected."s Yet contract law, 
antitrust law, and the like are excluded for reasons having little if 
anything to do with the extent or the imminence of the danger. 
They are excluded, and properly so, because they have nothing to 
do with what the concept of free speech is all about. 
36. See, e.g., T. EMERSoN, THE SYSTEM oF F'REBDoM oF ExPRESSION (1970); J. FEIN-
BERG, supra note 23, at 79-83; A. Mlma.E.ToHN, supra note 24; Emerson, First Amendment 
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422 (1980); Emerson, Toward a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in 
the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Nimmer, supra note 24; Kauper, Book Review, 58 
Mien. L. REv. 619, 626 (1960). 
37. See A. Mlma.E.ToHN, supra note 24. 
38. See Frantz, supra note 36. 
39. See works of T. Emerson cited in note 36 supra. 
40. See Nimmer, supra note 24. 
41. Attempting to define words in the law without reference te context or purpose is 
what is known as formalism or conceptualism. See H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAw 126 
(1961); J. STONE, supra note 20, at 149-58. The pull toward objectivity is perhaps especially 
strong in law, which people often expect to have a high degree of certainty and predictabil-
ity. This pull is often evidenced by the use of determinate meanings from nonlegal contexts, 
such as ordinary language. See Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF Pnn.osoPHY 264, 270 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). 
42. This much at the very least is implicit in the advocacy/incitement distinction. See 
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
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In thus trying to preserve an enclave of absoluteness, the de-
finers must then construct a theory that treats irrelevant (to the 
first amendment) speech like verbal betting in the same way as 
relevant but unprotected speech like incitement to burn down 
draft boards. Reductionism, the urge to reduce complex phenom-
ena to overly simple formulae, has been a pitfall throughout legal 
theory,"3 and no less so in relation to the first amendment. The 
efforts to create one formula that will generate an area of absolute 
protection have been heroic, but they have failed in one of two 
ways. Either they have, like Professor Emerson's distinction be-
tween expression and action,"" simplified things to such an extent 
that the resultant formula has little if any analytical or predictive 
value,"5 or they have, like the Meiklejohn interpretation, achieved 
consistency and workability at the expense of excluding from cov-
erage much that a full theory of freedom of speech ought to 
include."8 
The development of definitional-absolutist theories was en-
couraged largely by the desire to narrow the area of judicial discre-
tion."7 In searching for absolutism, however, theories of this type 
have collapsed the important distinction between coverage and 
43. See Hart, Dias and Hughes on Jurisprudence, 4 J. Soc'Y PUB. TEACHERS OF L. 
(N.S.) 143, 145 (1958) (it is a mistake to impose a "spurious unity" on the diversity of facts). 
44. See T. EMERSON, supra note 36; Emerson, supra note 36, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422; 
Emerson, supra note 36, 72 YALE L.J. 877. 
45. See L. TRmE, supra note 3, at 579, 598-601; Ely, supra note 3, at 1495; Yacavone, 
Emerson's Distinction, 6 CoNN. L. REv. 49 (1973). 
46. "[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, ar-
tistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not 
entitled to full First Amendment protection." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
231 (1977) (footnote omitted). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("reli-
gious, political, and ideological causes"); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ("serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"). 
Of course the received wisdom may be wrong. Perhaps (although I doubt it) the only 
rationally justifiable theory of free speech is a political one, in which case the simplicity of 
the underlying justification could be reflected in a proportionately simple doctrinal struc-
ture. It is noteworthy, however, that Meiklejohn, in The First Amendment is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 263, expanded his category to include far more than tbe political, on 
the theory that art, literature, and the like were all "relevant" to public decision making. 
Kalven called the expansion a "dialectic progression." Kalven, The New York Times Case: 
A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191, 221. 
Professor BeVier has avoided the limitations her theory would support by using "pragmatic 
concerns and institutional limitations" to allow protection of more than the political. BeV-
ier, supra note 5, at 322. Alas, the enemy has surrormded the fort, and Professor Bork is the 
only one left at his post. Bork, supra note 5. 
47. Professor Emerson, for example, stresses the "importance of devising clear rules of 
law that will, so far as possible, limit the discretion of lower courts and prosecutors .•.. " 
Emerson, supra note 36, 68 CALIF. L. REv. at 429: 
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protection. 48 This distinction is important in separating the ques-
tion of the category of action to which the right (any right) applies 
from the question of whether the right should prevail in cases of 
conflict with other interests, or for that matter other rights. No 
right can be unlimited in coverage, but it is at least plausible to 
imagine a right that is unlimited in protection (absolute) within 
the scope of coverage. As a matter more of political and sociologi-
cal fact than of necessary logical correllation, rights can more plau-
sibly be absolute when the range of coverage is narrow!9 Con-
versely, rights whose coverage is too broad are likely to offer little 
in the way of protection. One danger of definitional-absolutist the-
ories, then, is that the criteria of absolutism exerts an inward pull 
on the boundaries of coverage.150 When a problematic case arises, it 
is tempting to pull in the boundaries so that the case is now totally 
outside the perimeter of the right, thereby eliminating the prob-
~em. The danger, however, is that the boundaries may eventually 
become far narrower than the underlying theory, resulting in a 
constriction of the right no less than if the protection within the 
boundaries of coverage had been defeasible within that range.151 
It is always easier to ask one question than two, and this in 
part explains the recurrent appeal of definitional-absolutist theo-
ries. The effectiveness of such a scheme, however, depends on 
whether that one question can be answered. In this context, then, 
the question is "What is the definition of the category of conduct 
to which we can grant absolute protection under the first amend-
ment?" To answer this question we must in turn develop an un-
derlying theory of the principle of freedom of speech, and, if the 
protection is to be absolute, build into that theory all of the con-
ceivable exceptions to the principle.152 This seems an impossible 
task. 
Defining an area of absolute protection is likely to be impossi-
ble for two main reasons. First, it is unlikely that any one theory 
48. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. The distinction is implicit in a theory 
that takes constitutional rights to be "presumptive." See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Inti-
mate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 627 (1980). 
49. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 23, at 261; Emerson, supra note 36, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 
at 431. 
50. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 579, suggesting that the constricted territery is in 
addition likely in practice to be little stronger. 
51. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 75, 
79-80. 
52. My argument here has been aided by discussions with Alan Fuchs, who still 
disagrees. 
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can explain the concept of free speech, and no reason necessarily 
exists to suppose that it could. Freedom of speech need not have 
any one "essential" feature. It is much more likely a bundle of in-
terrelated principles sharing no common set of necessary and suffi-
cient defining characteristics.158 It is quite possible that the protec-
tion of political discussion and criticism, the aversion to censorship 
of art, and the desire to retain open inquiry in science and other 
academic disciplines, for example, are principles not reducible to 
any one common core. Any attempt to do so is likely to be both 
banal and to distort all of the principles involved. The standard 
jurisprudential and linguistic metaphor of the core and the fringe54 
is useful in its place, but it is harmful if it leads us to search for 
only one core when there may in fact be several, or many.1515 
The second difficulty in attempting to build all of the excep-
tions and qualifications into our definition of a right absolute in 
strength is that we simply do not know what all the exceptions and 
qualifications might be. Lacking omniscience, we can at best im-
perfectly predict the future. Rights whose shape incorporates all 
exceptions and qualifications would be extremely rough tools for 
dealing with the uncertainties of the future.158 Instead, we wisely 
achieve finer tools for future use by combining a relatively vague 
definition of the coverage of the right (for example, all speech of 
public importance or all discussion) with a relatively vague specifi-
cation of the weight of the right (for example, that it prevails in all 
cases in which the justification for the restriction is not a clear and 
present danger of great maguitude). It may seem odd that we use 
vagueness to give us finer tools for dealing with the future, but this 
should not be surprising,IS'l Precision, not vagueness, forecloses al-
53. It seems quite likely that the underlying theoretical components of freedom of 
speech are joined together in a family-resemblance relationship. See L. WrrrGENSTEIN, PHn.-
OSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 65-78 (3d ed. G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1967). See also W. 
JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGious ExPERIENCE 26-27 (1902). If this is correct, then the 
search for an "essence" of free speech is destined to be an exercise in futility. "One form of 
the craving for unity, then, is a craving for essences, and it is so strong that we tend to 
assume that everything actually has an essence •.•• " G. PrrcHER, THE PHU.OSOPHY OF 
WITrGENSTEIN 217 (1964). See also R. RoBINSON, DEFINITION 153-56 (1950). 
54. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 17 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 239 (1959); Williams, Lan-
guage and the Law-II, 61 LAw Q. REv. 179 (1945). 
55. Type-governed classes, which do contain a core and fringe, are distinguished from 
indeterminate classes, which do not, in Chandler, Three Kinds of Classes, 3 AM. PHn.. Q. 77 
(1966). Free speech is most likely the latter, hut in any event it certainly has not yet been 
proved to be the former. 
56. See Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 PHn.. Q. _ (1981). See also H.L.A. 
HART, supra note 41, at 125-26; Hart, supra note 41, at 270. 
57. "In many areas our situation is such that we cannot make maximally precise state-
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ternatives. "[A] painter with a limited palette can achieve more 
precise representations hy thinning and combining his colors than 
a mosaic worker can achieve with his limited variety of tiles, and 
the skillful superimposing of vaguenesses has similar advantages 
over the fitting together of precise technical terms. "58 If we could 
specify in advance what will happen in the future and how we wish 
to deal with those circumstances, we would have no need for the 
distinction between coverage and protection.59 We cannot hope to 
specify everything in advance, however, and so we properly distin-
guish between coverage and protection in order to maintain neces-
sary :flexibility. Any doubts on this score ought to have been settled 
by the decision in United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 80 a per-
fect example of a case whose existence could not possibly have 
been foreseen in the not-too-distant past.81 
The theoretical and practical difficulties of a definitional-abso-
lutist approach should not blind us to the importance of the cover-
age question even when the strength of the protection is less than 
absolute. If we look, for example, at that theory of the first amend-
ment that focuses on the purposes of the governmental action-we 
might call this the O'Brien82-Scanlon83-Ely64-Tribe85 theory-we 
ments without going far beyond the evidence." Alston, Vagueness, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY 218, 219 (P. Edwards ed. 1967}. "[T]he more precise our descriptive vocabu-
lary, the more difficult it seems to become to make the discriminations demanded for its 
application." I. SCHEFFLER, BEYOND THE LETTER: A PHILOSOPmcAL INQUIRY INTO AMBIGUITY, 
VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE 42 (1979}. See also A.N. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES 
OF IDEAS 91 (1933) ("Insistence on clarity at all costs is hased on sheer superstitution as to 
the mode in which human intelligence functions."). 
58. W.V.O. QUINE, WoRD AND OBJECT 127 (1960). See also Christie, Vagueness and 
Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REv. 885, 895-98 (1964). 
59. See Martin & Nickel, Recent Work on the Concept of Rights, 17 AM. PHIL. Q. 165, 
173-74 (1980). 
60. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), mandamus denied sub. nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 
443 U.S. 709, dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (preliminary injunction issued to en-
join publishers of the Progressive from publishing an article describing the method of manu-
facturing and assembling a hydrogen bomb). 
61. Professor Scanlon's example of home-made nerve gas, however, was a demonstra-
tion of quite remarkable foresight. Scanlon, supra note 5, at 211. 
62. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court upheld the conviction 
under 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b) (1965), which prohibits the knowing destruction of a selective 
service registration certificate, of defendant who burned his certificate in a public demon-
stration. The Court acknowledged an "incidental restriction" on first amendment fr!ledoms 
but held that such a law is constitutional "if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
ment interest," which in this instance was the assurance of a smoothly administered system 
for the raising of armed forces; "if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." ld. at 377. 
63. Scanlon, supra note 5. 
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find the full strength of the first amendment's prescriptions re-
served for those governmental actions that are "aimed at commu-
nicative impact."88 Although this theory quite properly looks at the 
totality of the governmental action rather than at some isolated 
description of the objects of that action, the theory still requires a 
description of the category of coverage. Laws against price fixing, 
extortion, perjury, and solicitation to garden-variety, nonpolitical 
crimes are all "aimed at communicative impact," yet these too are 
laws intuitively and correctly held to be outside the coverage of the 
first amendment. This is not to say that the theory based on gov-
ernmental action "aimed at communicative impact" is incorrect. 
On the contrary, that theory is a great contribution to understand-
ing the structure of the first amendment and to providing guidance 
for judicial resolution of a wide variety of hitherto troublesome 
cases. 87 The theory is incomplete, however, unless it provides some 
guidance, derived again from the deep theory of the principle of 
free speech, in determining what species of communicative impact 
are covered and what species of communicative impact are not. In 
this respect we once again must answer the question that started 
all of this: What is "speech" in the constitutional sense? 
At this point it is necessary to note two different ways of deal-
ing with this question. In defining the category of coverage of the 
first amendment, we have a choice between "defining in" and "de-
fining out." Under a "defining in" method, a definition of the cov-
64. Ely, supra note 3. 
65. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 580-88. See also Frantz, supra note 36, at 1440; Nim-
mer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
29, 44-46 (1973). 
66. L. TRmE, supra note 3, at 580. For criticism of the theory, see Farber, supra note 
3, at 744-45 nn.93-94; Emerson, supra note 36, 68 CALIF. L. REv. at 472-74. 
67. The theory's main virtue seems to be the way it enables us to avoid the hopeless 
search for a predominant feature, either speech or conduct, in the wide range of cases when 
communicative intent is coupled with conduct other than talking or writing. Much remains 
to be worked out, however, as can be seen in the quite different standards applied by 
Professors Tribe and Ely within the categories, or "tracks." Professor Ely, for example, 
would require "a clear and present danger of a serious evil" even in cases where the gove~­
mental action is not message-directed. J. Et.v, supra note 4, at 116. Surely, however, this is 
unworkably stringent. What about, for example, the politically motivated litterer, who per-
haps intentionally litters-maybe with apple cores or banana peels inscribed with the words, 
''Littering is Neat"-to advocate changes in the littering laws? If this activity cannot be 
prosecuted, something is seriously wrong, for all law violators could claim communicative 
intention. Surely this case by itself is not a "clear and present danger of a serious evil," at 
least as we have traditionally understood that standard. Of course, since Professor Ely 
would not employ a clear and present danger standard for the message-directed actions, he 
may not object to the dilution of the concept of clear and present danger. 
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erage of the first amendment is derived from the underlying theory 
of the first amendment. The category so defined will not, of course, 
be totally precise. Like all other categories it will have fuzzy edges 
where we are unsure whether the principle or rule applies. Were it 
otherwise we would need not judges but calculators. 68 The point is 
that we will have defined a category, and anything outside the cat-
egory is not within the coverage of the first amendment. 
The "defining in" approach assumes both that we can con-
struct a workable definition reflecting the deep theoretical prem-
ises of the concept of free speech and that such a definition can be 
taught69 to those who matter-the judges who must both apply it 
and refine its imprecision. If either of these assumptions is unwar-
ranted, it may be preferable to adopt the alternative approach of 
"defining out." Here we initially construct a coarse and intention-
ally over broad definition that is simple enough to be learned and 
applied easily and broad enough to encompass the full range of 
plausible theoretical justifications for a principle of freedom of 
speech. Some examples of such a category might be "all communi-
cations," or "everything that is 'speech' in ordinary language," or 
"all public discourse." Having created this intentionally overinclu-
sive category, we then carve out subcategories of noncoverage, to 
take care of contract law, perjury, extortion, and so on. These sub-
categories too must be conceived within the framework of a theory 
of free speech, although the focus here is negative (no reason to 
grant special protection against the power of government) rather 
than positive (grant special protection here because ... ). 
In a perfect world the "defining in" and "defining out" meth-
ods would yield identical results. Excluding the desiguated subcat-
egories of noncoverage from the initial coarse category of coverage 
would leave us in the end with the same refined category we would 
have had if we had started with a definition of inclusion. In short, 
starting from the center and working out would produce the same 
results as starting from the outside and working in. 
The world, however, is not perfect. Human beings make mis-
takes, and the entire apparatus of presumption and burden of 
proof, in any area of law, is designed to reflect an ordering of val-
ues in an imperfect world.70 When we use presumptions and allo-
68. Or, as Professor Gottlieb puts it, "subsumption machines." G. GOTILIEB, supra 
note 2, at 16. 
69. See text accompanying notes 190-97 infra. 
70. For an application to another aspect of first amendment theory, see Schauer, Fear, 
Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 
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cate the hurden of proof, we attempt to ensure that decisions 
under uncertainty will be biased away from restriction of those val-
ues we hold to be of greatest importance. In the context of the 
choice between defining in and defining out, it seems to follow that 
we can avoid more errors of underinclusion by defining out rather 
than defining in. Thus, perhaps the preferable course is to begin 
with the presumption that all communication is covered by the 
first amendment and then create areas of noncoverage, regarding 
which the burden of proof of nonapplicability of first amendment 
principles can be met.71 
This perspective provides an explanation, for example, for the 
commercial speech cases.71 If we started from the center, or core, 
the question would be whether that category of coverage, derived 
from the theoretical foundations of the first amendment, included 
commercial advertising. Neither space nor need exists to answer 
that question here, but it seems not altogether unlikely that the 
answer would be "No," just as it had been in the past.78 If instead 
we have a process of defining out, we would assume that all com-
munication is covered by the first amendment and exclude a sub-
category of commercial advertising only if it could be shown to be 
unrelated to the purposes of a principle of freedom of speech. A 
close reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.74 
shows this focus, for the primary question there was not, "Should 
commercial speech be covered?", but in effect rather, "Why 
shouldn't commercial speech be covered?"715 The questions are dif-
ferent, and it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Court was 
(1978). 
71. See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 956-57. 
72. E.g., Bates v. Arizona State Bar Ass'n, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. 
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 
(1975). See generally Farbor, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. 
UL. REV. 372 (1979); Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 SUP. CT. 
REV. 45; 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 205 (1976). 
73. See Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. 
REv. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First 
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979). "It is by no means self-evident that commercial 
speech will fit into the system of freedom of expression at all." Emerson, supra note 36, 68 
CALIF. L. REv. at 640. 
74. 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
75. Note the Court's formulation of the issue in terms of whether there is an "excep-
tion" for commercial speech, id. at 760, or whether the commercial nature of the interest 
"disqualifies" the advertiser from first amendment protection. I d. at 762. The strong indica-
tion is that an exception, rather than inclusion, bears the burden of justification. 
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simply not persuaded that commercial advertising was sufficiently 
different76 to justify carving out a special area of noncoverage. 
As this first act draws to a close, it is useful to summarize by 
noting that categorization in this first sense refers to the inevitable 
process of delineating the range of coverage of the first amend-
ment. Although various methods are available for defining that 
category-from ordinary language, philosophy, or history;77 from 
the outside in or the inside out; with a view towards absolute pro-
tection or towards strong but not absolute protection; and so 
·on-it is impossible to avoid the process. In this sense categoriza-
tion can scarcely be called a first amendment technique, because it 
cannot be avoided. The only question is how the category will be 
drawn. 
III. AcT Two: THE VARIETIES OF SPEECH 
Our first look at categorization and the first amendment fo-
cused on the first amendment as itself constituting a category. 
From this perspective the conclusion that categorization in this 
sense is unavoidable was inevitable. The question now is whether 
we can or should go further in the process of categorization; that is, 
does the category of conduct covered by the first amendment in 
turn contain further subcategories? Having concluded that the first 
amendment covers a particular set of circumstances, do we then 
apply a uniform test to determine whether the first amendment 
protects the act, or do we apply differing tests depending upon the 
subcategory within the first amendment into which the particular 
case falls? 
Hostility toward the creation of subcategories within the first 
amendment has been a pervasive, albeit not invariably determina-
76. "Our question is whether speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial 
transaction,' ..• is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas,' ..• and from ' "truth, sci-
ence, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administra-
tion of Government,"' that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not." I d. 
77. It is common to equate interpretivism with either literalism or historicism. See, 
e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 712-13 (1975). 
This is a mistake. Many of the terms of the Constitution, such as "freedom of speech" and 
"equal protection of the laws," are theory-laden, and an explication of those terms, guided 
by a philosophical theory, can avoid the pitfalls of both literalism and historicism without 
abandoning the strong attractions of even a clause-bound interpretivism. Exploring how this 
is to be done, however, is far beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, it is not entirely clear 
that Professor Grey himself does not endorse such an explicatory interpretivism as a com-
mendable form of noninterpretivist review. See Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitu-
tion: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844 n.S 
(1978). 
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tive, theme in contemporary free speech doctrine.78 This hostility 
can be embodied in a bipolar structure of no protection and full 
protection.79 "Full protection" refers not necessarily to absolute 
protection but only to the maximum level of protection that the 
first amendment provides, which may, for example, be only the use 
of some form of a "clear and present danger" standard. If we were 
to refuse to recognize any subcategories within the first amend-
ment, we would determine first whether the facts of the case fell 
outside or inside the coverage of the first amendment. If they fell 
outside, there would be no protection, at least not by the first 
amendment.80 If they fell inside, the full protection of the first 
amendment, however much that might be, would attach to the 
conduct in question. Implicit in this ali-or-nothing approach is an 
extreme reluctance to assign differing values to the speech that is 
covered by the first amendment. The works of Shakespeare have 
the same first amendment value as Playboy, which in turn has the 
same first amendment value as wearing a black armband or argn-
ing for the virtues of Nazism. 
At bottom this conscious refusal to subcategorize is founded in 
the belief that first amendment protection should not turn on 
whether a statement is on one side or the other of a particular 
question. 81 If an argument for the roundness of the Earth is pro-
tected, then arguments for flatness are protected to the same ex-
tent. If arguments for capitalism are to be protected, then so too 
must arguments for socialism. Moreover, as can be seen from cases 
like Brandenburg and Skokie, if arguments for racial equality are 
protected, so are arguments for racial hatred and intolerance.82 
78. This has usually been expressed in terms of the question of content regulation. See 
generally Farber, supra note 3; Karst, supra note 3; Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because 
of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 
(1978). See also Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. 
L. REv. 519, 537-42 (1979); Buchanan, Autonomy and Categories of Expression: A Reply to 
Professor Scanlon, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 551, 557-59 (1979). 
79. See Stone, supra note 78, at 82-83. Note that some, such as Professor Emerson, 
equate "full protection" with absolute protection within a defined scope. See Emerson, 
supra note 36, 68 CALIF. L. REv. at 433-35. 
80. It is a mistake to assume that heightened judicial scrutiny for a verbal act necessa-
rily arises only from the first amendment. One who believed, for example, that the four-
teenth amendment contained privacy aspects that protected private homosexuality could 
argue for the constitutional protection for obscenity without challenging the conclusion that 
obscenity was not speech in the constitutional sense. Had Lochner still been good law, Vir-
ginia Pharmacy could conceivably have been decided on those grounds alone. 
81. See Stone, supra note 78, at 83, discussing viewpoint-based content regulation. 
See also Farher, supra note 3, at 733-37. 
82. See notes 25 & 27 supra. The most important feature of the Skokie litigation was 
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Certainly there can be little quarrel with this, for the decision not 
to allow free speech protection to turn on the point of view 
adopted by the speaker goes to both the epistemological and politi-
cal cores of free speech theory.83 
It has frequently been thought to be only a small step from 
the aversion to regulation based on the point of view espoused to 
an equal aversion to regulation based on the subject matter of the 
speech. The classic statement is that of Justice Stewart in Kings-
ley International Pictures Corp. u. Regents of University of New 
York:a. "[The Constitution] protects advocacy of the opinion that 
adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of social-
ism or the single tax."815 There is a difference, however, between 
saying that advocacy of capitalism is permitted and advocacy of 
socialism is not and saying that discussion of economic policy is 
permitted but discussion of sexual morality is not. However loose 
the boundaries may be, distinctions drawn on the basis of view-
point are importantly different from distinctions drawn on the ba-
sis of subject matter.86 
Despite the differences, however, strong reasons remain for ex-
panding the hostility to viewpoint-based regulation to include sub-
ject matter-based regulation as well. Subje_ct matter restrictions 
are rarely viewpoint-neutral.87 For example, no restrictions existed 
on public condemnation of adultery at the time Kingsley was de-
cided or at any other time. Indeed, New York acknowledged as 
much in Kingsley when it argued that the problem was the conflict 
between what the film portrayed and "the moral standards, the re-
the fact that it was an easy case. The efforts by the town to force the situation into catego-
ries like "fighting words" or "verbal assaults" demonstrate just how bizarre it would be to 
suggest th11t it might be relevant under the first amendment to argue that Nazis are bad 
people espousing hateful ideas. There can, of course, be principled distinctions between Na-
zis and other people. It is just that our justified fears of viewpoint-based discrimination 
block any other distinguishing features that might be available. For example, although it is 
now irrelevant under the first amendment that the speaker either does not believe in or 
wishes to eliminate the system of free speech, such a distinction has some philosophical 
plausibility. See Schauer, Free Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, in VALUES IN CoN-
FLICT 228 (B. Leiser eel. 1981). 
83. Both the "marketplace of ideas" theory and the Meiklejohn "argument from de-
mocracy" are premised at the very least on the inability of government to determine ques-
tions of truth or falsity within the appropriate spheres. Viewpoint-based content regulation 
is no less than just this type of a determination. 
84. 360 u.s. 684 (1959). 
85. Id. at 689. 
86. See Farber, supra note 3, at 733-37; Stone, supra note 78, at 83-84, 108. 
87. See Stone, supra note 78, at 101-03, 109-11. 
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ligious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry."88 Thus, Justice 
Stewart's analogy to advocacy of socialism and the single tax was 
in one sense inapt, for the case could conceivably have permitted a 
prohibition on the subject matter of adultery so long as the view-
point-based regulation was eliminated. This result would have 
been bizarre, largely because the kind of suppression that offends 
the first amendment can often be accomplished as conveniently 
and as effectively by excluding an area from discussion as by ex-
cluding a particular point of view. Placing an entire subject outside 
the range of discussion not only prevents discussion of that subject 
but also serves quite effectively to entrench the status quo. Re-
strictions on subject matter limit knowledge within that subject to 
what is then known, and this freezing of existing knowledge is 
hardly different from a viewpoint-based restriction. 
The more serious objection to not moving from viewpoint neu-
trality to subject matter neutrality, however, is that the distinction 
finds no basis in the theoretical foundations of the first amend-
ment. There are an infinite number of ways of drawing distinctions 
and therefore an infinite number of potential categories. The cor-
rectness of a category cannot be evalua¥!d in the abstract, but only 
in the context of the purposes for creating a category. 89 Distin-
guishing among speakers on the basis of the loudness of their 
voices or on the basis of their accents is fine if we are conducting 
auditions for a theatrical performance; it is of course impermissible 
if we are attempting to create differences in the amount of protec-
tion available under the first amendment. If the first amendment is 
in fact designed in theory to protect discussion over a wide area, a 
subject matter restriction is no more justifiable than a viewpoint 
restriction. The problem with a subject matter restriction is that it 
is inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the first 
amendment. 
Much the same can be said for categories based on the manner 
of presentation, for once again restrictions on the manner of pres-
entation could quite likely exclude from public discussion much of 
the diversity of opinion that the first amendment so prizes. When 
Justice Harlan said in Cohen v. California90 that "one man's vul-
88. 360 U.S. at 688. 
89. "Different purposes require different classifications and hence different distinc-
tions." Singer, Moral Rules and Principles, in EssAYS IN MoRAL PHILOSOPHY 160, 160 (A.I. 
Melden ed. 1958). 
90. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
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garity is another's lyric,"91 he quite correctly warned of the dangers 
to diversity of viewpoint that could result from attempting to 
channel public debate into preexisting patterns. As a result, we 
have tended to assume that once an act has been found to be 
within the coverage of the first amendment, the extent of its pro-
tection should not vary with the position expressed, the subject 
matter dealt with, or the mode of expression employed by the 
speaker. 
Still, at least four arguments can be marshalled in favor of cat-
egorization within the first amendment. First, if we take the "full 
protection within" rule as the standard, there may be pressure to 
keep troublesome categories completely outside. When the choice 
is all or nothing, the difficulties of "all" may lead courts to choose 
"nothing." Thus, it may be that one of the reasons for the histori-
cal exclusion of commercial advertising92 was the potential for 
problems, especially in terms of truth and falsity,93 that would ex-
ist if commercial advertising were treated in the same manner as 
advocacy of adultery or the single tax. If the creation of a separate 
category within the first amendment is precluded, a tempting solu-
tion is merely to keep the speech that would constitute that cate-
gory outside first amendment ·protection. Similar observations 
seem also applicable to the pre-New York Times94 exclusion of de-
famatory speech from the coverage of the first amendment.95 
Second, not all forms of speech are necessarily amenable to 
the same analytic approach." The tests and tools created to deal 
91. /d. at 25. This quotation is generally taken out of context. Justice Harlan said that 
"it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." ld. (emphasis ad-
ded). That seems to suggest that the distinction between vulgarity and lyric is also often 
something other than a subjective judgment. I doubt that this is correct, but we should not 
attribute too much subjectivism to Justice Harlan. 
92. E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
93. Professor Ely rightfully attributes much of this to "an epistemological 'sophistica-
tion' that seems excessive." J. ELY, supra note 4, at 233. The vast majority of advertising 
claims are simply more verifiable than ethical or political claims, and to hold otherwise 
seems most peculiar. This is not to say, however, that there may not be problems if we try 
to make too much of a distinction between fact and opinion. Schauer, Language, Truth, and 
the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263 (1978). 
94. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
95. Similarly, falsehoods about individuals are quite frequently demonstrable in a way 
that statements about morals, politics, art, and sex are not. This much seems implicit in the 
Court's granting factual falsehood no more than "strategic" protection. Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 
295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring). 
96. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 785; Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 946; Shiffrin, Gov-
ernment Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 565, 609-12 (1980). 
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with the likes of Brandenburg, Whitney, Schenck, and Debs, 87 for 
example, may not be those most appropriate for dealing with 
problems of a quite different kind. Neither false advertising nor 
false attacks on private reputation fit easily into anything even 
close to a "clear and present danger" formula-nor, for that mat-
ter, does speech that offends rather than causes harm in a nar-
rower sense. We are accustomed to thinking in terms of levels of 
protection, but it may be that different categories of speech should 
be treated differently, which does not necessarily entail more or 
less. 
Third, and somewhat related to the second argument, most 
first amendment theory is formulated around the "advocacy" para-
digm. When statements of fact are concerned, for example, many 
of the skeptical presuppositions of the first amendment are either 
irrelevant or highly attenuated.S8 It is true that many statements 
of fact contain statements of opinion as well88 and that factual de-
terminations are often erroneous, but the differences between "this 
car has a six-cylinder engine" and "socialism is wonderful" are ap-
parent to all but the most resolute skeptic. Some people may have 
so little confidence in their own factual judgments that they always 
sit down gingerly for fear that the chair they see is only an appari-
tion, but we hardly need tailor first amendment doctrine around 
them. It may be, therefore, that appropriate categories could recog-
nize the differences in the extent to which first amendment princi-
ples are applicable to the variety of speech acts, of which advocacy 
and factual description are but two.100 
Finally, the refusal to categorize is frightfully counter-intui-
tive. Many commentators101 have strongly criticized Justice Ste-
vens' observation in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.102 
97. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). These are generally considered to be the landmark cases 
in the development of first amendment doctrine relating to political advocacy. 
98. See notes 93 & 95 supra. 
99. Schauer, supra note 93, at 276-300. See also Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 677-78. 
100. It appears, for example, that the whole range of "performative" utterances, see 
J.L. AusTIN, Performative Utterances, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233-52 (3d ed. J.O. Urmson 
& G.J. Warnock eds. 1979), could within one unifying principle be excluded from the first 
amendment, but developing that principle must wait for another time. See Greenawalt, 
supra note 5, at 680-83. 
101. See Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HAsTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977); 
Stone, supra note 78, at 96-100. See also Friedman, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential 
Impact of Young v. American Mini Theatres, 28 HAsTINGs L.J. 1293 (1977). 
102. 427 u.s. 50 (1976). 
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that "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to 
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' ex-
hibited in the theaters of our choice;"103 but he was right. We 
would not, if that were all we were protecting. The difficulty comes 
in describing the behavior, and therefore the category of behavior, 
at the appropriate level of generality, but most people do believe 
that there are "commonsense di:fferences"104 between different cat-
egories of utterances. Moreover, most people believe that some cat-
egories are more important than others, with great agreement 
about many questions of relative worth. Political argument is sim-
ply more important than "Specified Sexual Activities," and Ham-
let is simply better literature than "Dance With the Dominant 
Whip" or "Cult of the Spankers. "105 Anyone who holds otherwise is 
just plain wrong. Of course, things are not this simple. Our com-
monsense categories have fuzzy edges, and there is much more 
agreement that Hamlet is good literature and "Dance With the 
Dominant Whip" is bad literature than there is about in which cat-
egory to put Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure106 or George Car-
lin's "Seven Dirty Words" monologue.107 While we might be quite 
confident in saying that political argument is more important than 
idle gossip about absent acquaintances, the relative merits of polit-
ical argument, art, ancient history, and philosophy are far more 
debatable. 
If the categories we would employ in subcategorizing were 
more well-defined, we would perhaps be more comfortable with 
subdividing the first amendment. Unfortunately, however, the cat-
egories of political speech, entertainment, and literature, for exam-
ple, have such loose and overlapping boundaries that the dangers 
of miscategorization are particularly strong. The same applies even 
to many distinctions between fact and opinion.108 Moreover, the 
problem is compounded by the difficulty in determining the appro-
103. Id. at 76. This part of the Young opinion did not command a majority of the 
Court. Only the Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens 
on this part of the opinion. See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) 
("while some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First 
Amendment concern."). 
104. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizeus Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). 
105. These are among the more suggestive titles among the materials at issue and 
listed by the Court in Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
106. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
107. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
108. See note 93 supra. 
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priate level of generality for the description of a category and by 
the fact that we are forced to describe these categories in words 
that are at best ill-suited to the purpose. Absent the ability to cre-
ate a new technical vocabulary for every category in law, we face a 
high risk of conceptual vagueness in using ordinary language to 
convey complex and technical concepts.109 Young would have been 
far less troublesome had it been possible to describe with some 
precision the category of materials subject to restriction but not to 
outright prohibition. It was not, however-although the Court's ef-
forts fell especially short of the ideal110-and as a result, cases like 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundationm followed shortly thereafter. The 
problem with Young was not as much the result as the possibility 
it created for restrictions on speech with considerably more value, 
which is precisely what occurred in Pacifica.112 Were it possible to 
articulate a stopping point, or had the Court even tried to specify 
some more precise boundary for the Young category, Young itself 
would have been somewhat less troublesome. 
Much of this problem has in the past been discussed under the 
rubric of an aversion to "content regulation."113 This description is 
of course deceptively broad. We engage in a form of content regu-
109. For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of 
moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted 
which could convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We should lose 
the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associa-
tions, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much 
in the clearness of our thought. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897). The extraneous associa-
tions to which Holmes refers, however, are only part of the problem. More serious is that 
the distinctions of importance to the law are not necessarily embedded in ordinary language, 
at least not in single words or short phrases. They are most likely explainable in ordinary 
langnage only at the expense of the brevity and emotional force often thought to be admira-
ble facets of a judicial opinion. 
This problem of the inaptness of ordinary language to law is in tum merely an instance 
of the larger problem of new uses in general. "Men will always be finding themselves with a 
new thing to express and no word for it, and usually they will meet the problem by applying 
whichever old word seems nearest, and thus the old word will acquire another meaning or a 
stretched meaning." R. ROBINSON, DEFINITION 55 (1950). 
110. That is the problem with the clever phrase. Justice Stevens' commentary about 
the circumstances in which he would send his children to war is a nice tum of phrase, espe-
cially if you agree with his conclusion. It cannot, however, plausibly function as a standard 
of gnidance for lower courts and future cases, which is presumably at least one of the pur-
poses of a Supreme Court opinion. Bee Schauer, supra note 23, at 217-19. 
111. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First 
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1228-37, 1265-75, 
1279-88 (1978). 
112. Schauer, supra note 70, at 716 n.147. 
113. See auth?rities cited at note 78 supra. 
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lation when we say, as we must, that some communicative acts are 
inside the first amendment and others are outside. What we mean 
when we express animosity towards content regulation is that we 
should not create subcategories within the first amendment that 
are inconsistent with the theoretical premises of the concept of 
freedom of speech.114 Morever, we do not wish to create subcatego-
ries that, either because of the inherent indeterminacy of the cate-
gory or because of the difficulty in verbally describing that subcat-
egory, create an undue risk of oversuppression. While these are 
powerful reasons, they are not so conclusive that they should pre-
vail in every case. When strong reasons for creating a subcategory 
present themselves, and when the dangers can be minimized or 
eliminated, the mechanized uttering of "content regulation" need 
not prevent the embodiment in first amendment doctrine of the 
plain fact that there are different varieties of speech. This is best 
illustrated by a few examples. 
One obvious subcategory in contemporary first amendment 
doctrine is that of commercial speech.1115 This subcategory seems 
on balance to be rather well-conceived, at least if we accept the far 
from obvious premise116 that commercial speech is within the first 
amendment at all. Commercial speech is different in important 
ways from most of the speech that is within the first amendment. 
It embodies factual statements generally quite easily verifiable,117 
it is regulated for reasons both less suspect and less capable of 
abuse than those reasons used to justify restrictions of speech on 
political, moral, and related issues, 118 and its inclusion within the 
114. Had this distinction been clearer, the Court would have been less likely to use 
decisions delineating the general category of the first amendment to justify the creation of 
subcategories within the first amendment, as it did in both Young and Pacifica. Once we 
appreciate the difference between categorization1 and categorization., the fallacy of this 
move is exposed. 
115. One thing that makes commercial speech so obviously a special subcategory is the 
Court's specific pronouncements to that effect. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 
n.9 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 462 n.20 (1978); Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 
(1976). 
116. See authorities cited at note 73 supra. 
117. See note 93 supra. 
118. One powerful justification for a principle of freedom of speech is what I have 
called "the argument from negative implication." Schauer, supra note 82. It may be that 
there is nothing especially valuable about speech as compared to other valuable forms of 
conduct, but that the regulation of speech entails particular dangers. We thus erect a princi-
ple of free speech to guard against these special dangers, dangers particularly apparent in 
the area of political speech. "Courts must police inhibitions on expression and other politi-
cal activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so; ins have a way of wanting to 
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first amendment is based on reasons quite distinct from those ap-
plicable to other forms of communication.119 Commercial speech is 
also a category relatively easy both to identify and to describe, and 
it demands the use of analytic tools different from those used for, 
say, political speech. For example, in most other areas of the first 
amendment we expect appellate courts to undertake what is essen-
tially de novo factual review.lllo Surely, however, it would be bi-
zarre to suggest the same when an issuer of securities challenges a 
finding of- the SEC that a registration statement is false or mis-
leading. m The precise ways in which commercial speech doctrine 
will reflect the "commonsense differences"122 between it and other 
speech within the first amendment remain to be developed in the 
cases, but there seems little reason to suggest that the effort is 
misguided. 
Similar arguments support the creation of a subcategory to 
deal with defamatory speech, another area in which different stan-
dards of protection are employed. The subcategory is easily identi-
fiable, lsa the interest in protecting individuals from the publication 
of demonstrable falsehoods about them is not inconsistent with the 
theoretical foundations of the first amendment, 124 and the 
make sure the outs stay out." J. ELY, supra note 4, at 106. This seems much less of a dange~: 
in respect to the regulation of commercial advertising. But see Scanlon, supra note 78, at 
540-42. 
119. The consumer protection rationale espoused in Virginia Pharmacy seems only 
remotely related to most other sources of free speech doctrine. 
120. See Old Dominion Branch 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing 
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188-90 (1964) (opinion 
of Brennan, J.); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,497-98 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
121. See Schauer, supra note 93, at 298-99. 
122. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). 
123. Defamation is easily separable because the application of the subcategory is trig-
gered by the plaintiff's recourse to a relatively discrete and well-defined common-law cause 
of action. But when, as in, for example, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the 
standards for a defamation action are transposed to quite different settings, the question of 
identification becomes more difficult. 
124. See, e.g., Feinberg, Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion, in PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAw 135 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975); Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Rea-
son and Decency, 65 Va. L. Rev. 785 (1979). My references to the "theoretical foundations 
of the first amendment" are woefully incomplete-indeed platitudinous-but they serve a 
purpose. It is important that we recognize just how much of the legal structure of first 
amendment doctrine is determined by the first amendment's substantive philosophical 
foundations. We may choose to draw these philosophical foundations from the Framers' 
view of them, or we may (preferably, in my view) choose to construct a theory of free speech 
not constrained by the views of those long dead. In any event, we must do something. At-
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problems presented do not fit neatly into a "clear and present dan-
ger" type standard of review. It may be that the rules now in force 
for dealing with defamatory statements are either too strict or too 
lenient/25 but that is not the point. Regardless of which particular 
rules we choose, there seems little cause not to embody in first 
amendment doctrine our intuitive belief that defamation of an in-
dividual is not the same as urging a socialist revolution. 
The recent "offensive speech" cases evidence the establish-
ment of yet another subcategory. After Cohen, 126 Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville/21 and Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad/28 
it was commonly supposed that the offensiveness, without more, of 
an utterance was insufficient reason to justify any difference in 
treatment from nonoffensive speech. After Young and Pacifica, 
however, it certainly appears that offensive speech is a subcategory 
tempting to apply the first amendment without some theoretical vision of free speech is 
mere stumbling in the dark. See also Scanlon, supra note 78, at 535 (discussing relationship 
among "foundational level," "level of rights," and "level of policy"). 
125. See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422 
(1975); Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Among Conflicting 
Approaches, 75 MicH. L. REv. 43 (1976); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First 
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205 (1976); Ingber, supra note 124; Robertson, Defama-
tion and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 
199 (1976). 
126. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Defendant peacefully walked through the 
Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a jacket displaying the words "Fuck the Draft" and 
was convicted under the California Penal Code of disturbing the peace by offensive conduct. 
The Supreme Court noted that this was not an obscene expression, that the words were not 
likely to provoke violent reaction, and that any offended bystander could avoid the expres-
sion by simply averting his eyes. The Court acknowledged first amendment protection of the 
"emotive" aspect of speech represented by such language and warned that to forbid the use 
of any particular word was to create a risk of the suppression of ideas. California's prohibi-
tion of the "mere public display" of this language was therefore held to violate the first and 
fourteenth amendments. 
127. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). A Jacksonville ordinance prohibited the showing of a film 
containing nudity when the screen was visible from a public place. The Court held the ordi-
nance invalid on its face as an unjustifiable restriction of first amendment freedoms. The 
ordinance was seen as a possible deterrence of legitimate expression since it was not aimed 
exclusively at sexually explicit nudity and discriminated among films solely on the basis of 
content without clear reasons for the distinction. Furthermore, the public's privacy interest 
was not endangered since an offended viewer simply could avert his eyes. 
128. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). The promoter of the musical "Hair" sought a permanent 
injunction enjoining the denial of its application to use a city-owned auditorium by the 
directors of the auditorium. The district court found that the objectionable conduct in the 
production, nudity and simulated sex, was pure conduct and completely separate from the 
musical's speech elements and was therefore not entitled to first amendment protection. 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the direc-
tor's action constituted a prior restraint in violation of the first amendment because of the 
lack of procedural safeguards to ensure an accurate determination of whether "Hair" was 
entitled to first amendment protection from regulation. 
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in which restrictions will be permitted so long as those restrictions 
do not have the effect of a de facto prohibition on dissemination of 
the material at issue.129 This subcategory, however, is far more 
troublesome than the subcategories for either commercial speech 
or defamation, but we need to probe further in order to locate the 
source of those troubles. 
First, a subcategory must have some relationship to a permis-
sible first amendment purpose. Legal categories are not natural in 
the way that other categories may be.180 Human beings create legal 
categories to serve a purpose, and the category can be no more per-
missible than the purpose. It should be apparent here that offen-
siveness simpliciter as a category is hardly consistent with most of 
the antimajoritarian premises of the first amendment.181 A wide 
range of utterances, such as "God is dead," "Hitler was a great 
man," and "The American flag is a symbol of oppression," are 
quite likely to cause offense to many people, yet Young and 
Pacifica do not (it is hoped) indicate that any of these utterances 
may in any way be restricted.182 If so, it is more than mere offense 
that is the defining feature of this subcategory. It is offense of a 
certain kind, or offense plus something more. If it is offense of the 
sexual or scatological variety, the continuing validity of Cohen is 
called into question, for Carlin's words were no more likely to stim-
ulate than were Cohen's.188 On the other hand, perhaps the defini-
tion of the subcategory is in terms of sexual or scatological offense 
combined with an absence of "important" content. Again, however, 
it is hard to discern why Carlin's commentary about language is 
less important than Cohen's commentary about the Selective Ser-
129. On the availability of the materials from other sources, see FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50, 62 (1976). 
130. Whether categories or classes exist in the world or are just creatures of our form 
of conceptualization is a controversy of recurrent philosophical interest, but is fortunately 
not germane to this Article. 
131. See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 951 (" .•. if 'offensiveness' were the test, majority 
rule would replace the first amendment."). 
132. "Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a 
reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First 
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas." FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978). 
133. "The belief that these words are harmless does not necessarily confer a First 
Amendment privilege to use them while proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity 
is harmless does not license one to communicate that conviction by the indiscriminate dis-
tribution of an obscene leaflet." Id. at 746 n.22. The very comparison between obscene (in 
the ordinary sense) words and obscene (in the constitutional sense) material shows not only 
confusion, but also just how shaky the pedestal is on which Cohen now rests. 
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vice System, and it is equally hard to discern why a radio broad-
cast is more intrusive than activity in the courthouse lobby.134 I 
cannot imagine why one could not switch off the radio, but there 
may be quite good reasons for having to remain with Cohen in the 
courthouse. Turning off a radio is much easier than averting your 
eyes from someone who is in the same room. Just try it sometime. 
This criticism of Pacifica is hardly novel, 185 and I do not wish 
to belabor the matter here. The point I wish to make is that the 
creation of a category must be justified by reasons underlying the 
features distinguishing that category from others. When those rea-
sons are not applied in all cases in which they are, by their own 
terms, applicable, then the attempt to create a category has mis-
fired. In traditional terminology we would say that the category-
creating case was unprincipled.186 It is, however, impossible for a 
case to be unprincipled in isolation. What makes a case unprinci-
pled is the refusal in future cases to treat cases alike within the 
articulated category. If Cohen, Spence v. Washington,187 and their 
ilk are to survive, then Pacifica and Young have not created a sub-
category at all. If Cohen, Spence, and others are to be overruled or 
limited on the authority of Young and Pacifica, then Young and 
Pacifica have indeed created a subcategory within the first amend-
ment that is to be treated differently. In that case Young and 
Pacifica could no longer be taken to be unprincipled, but would 
simply be wrong. There is a di:fference.188 
Moreover, a subcategory based in part on offensiveness will be 
notoriously vague. Vagueness probably cannot be completely elimi-
nated in any area of law, but that is no excuse for failing to recog-
nize degrees of vagueness.189 "Where do you draw the line?" argu-
ments are usually as wrong as they are tiresome. uo The inability to 
134. Had Pacifica been based on the scarcity rationale of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), few people would have been independently exercised about 
Pacifica. It is the conspicuous eschewal of scarcity doctrine in Pacifica that legitimizes the 
fears that Pacifica has great import for the regulation of any speech found to be offensive. 
135. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 111, at 1228-37, 1265-75, 1279-88. 
136. See generally Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1963). 
137. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
138. "Principled legal judgment is not so much a matter of content as it is of form." 
Golding, supra note 136, at 42. 
139. On degrees of vagueness, see M. BLACK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 32-49 (1949); 
L.J. CoHEN, THE DIVERSITY OF MEANING 265-76 (1st ed. 1962); I. SCHEFFLER, supra note 57, 
at 42-49, 62-63; Khatchadourian, Vagueness, 12 PHIL. Q. 138, 148-49 (1962); Russell, Vague-
ness, 1 AUSTRALASIAN J. PSYCH. & PHIL. 84, 90 (1923). 
140. The fallacy inherent in refusing to make distinctions when no bright line of de-
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draw a precise line cannot sensibly be used to justify the refusal to 
draw lines. Nevertheless, the opposite error is equally dangerous. It 
is a mistake to assume that because all lines are fuzzy, fuzziness 
cannot vary or can never constitute an objection to the creation of 
a legal category. When, as with "offensiveness," the category is so 
inherently and extremely indeterminate and so linguistically ill-de-
fined, a serious risk exists that the category will in practice be mis-
applied, and a powerful argument therefore arises against the crea-
tion of the category. In the first amendment, as in all of law, the 
task of the judge is to classify the particular facts of the case 
within the appropriate category.u1 Increasing the number of cate-
gories may involve an increased risk of misclassification, 1" 2 even if 
the categories are theoretically sound. When the error of misclas-
sification is likely to occur in derogation of constitutionally pre-
ferred values, us categorization in the sense of creating additional 
subcategories is a technique to be employed with only the greatest 
of caution. 
For these reasons the notion of a presumption is once again 
useful, just as it is useful in choosing between "defining in" and 
"defining out."u• If we accept the principle that the first amend-
ment seeks to protect that which may at first sight (or even upon 
further reflection) seem worthless, then we must guard against the 
pressure to create subcategories that will leave to judges in a par-
ticular case the determination of either the truth or the social util-
marcation is present is most vividly illustrated by the sorites ("the heaper") paradoL Just 
because one grain does not make a heap and just because the addition of any one grain does 
not mark the point at which we can say there is now a heap, the conclusion is not mandated 
that there are no such things as heaps. See generally M. BLACK, MARGINS OF PRECISION 2-12 
(1970); Gillespie, Abortion and Human Rights, 87 ETHics 237, 238-43 (1977); Williams, Lan-
guage and the Law-11, 61 LAw Q. REv. 179, 181-85 (1945). What makes law unique, how-
ever, is the extent to which the relatively indeterminate decision on "where to draw the 
line" in the first case becomes a concrete rule of decision for the next case. 
141. See Hart, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence, 29 PRoc. ARisT. Soc. (SUPP.) 
239, 259 (1955). There is an important difference between "what happened" and "how are 
we to characterize it." J. WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO·ANALYSIS 251·52 (1953). More-
over, even the question of "what happened" is in almost every case theory-dependent. G. 
GOTTLIEB, supra note 2, at 54 (notions of "materiality" are derived from preexisting theoret-
ical standards); Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 
169 (1930); Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 Moo. L. REv. 597 (1959). 
142. See I. SCHEFFLER, supra note 57, at 41-42, 63-65. 
143. This can occur either if there is a greater frequency of errors of oversuppression, 
as is likely with a counter-intuitive value such as freedom of speech, or if the proportion of 
errors is inconsistent with the relative harms of the respective errors. See generally Schauer, 
supra note 70. 
144. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra. 
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ity of a covered communicative act. We can accomplish this best 
by creating a presumption, albeit rebuttable, against the creation 
of subcategories within the first amendment.145 When, as in the 
case of commercial advertising and defamation, it can be affirma-
tively -demonstrated that it is possible to create a subcategory that 
is consistent with the theoretical foundations of the first amend-
ment, that is capable of principled definition and application, and 
that is sufficiently determinate that the dangers of incorrect appli-
cation are manageable, then the presumption against creating sub-
categories may be overcome. The subcategory foreshadowed by 
Young and Pacifica is particularly unfortunate because it exhibits 
none of these features. Thus, it is a compound error, for any one of 
these factors should be sufficient to defeat the proposed 
subcategory. 
IV. ACYr THREE: RULES 
Having determined that a set of facts lies within the coverage 
of the first amendment and having placed those facts within the 
appropriate subcategory of the first amendment, the question 
finally arises of just how we will decide the case, or, more accu-
rately, how the judge will decide the case. It is at this stage that we 
can no longer escape facing up to the recurrent question of ad hoc 
balancing.146 The question at this stage is what the rules of gui-
dance for the judge will look like within a given first amendment 
category. 
Here the question of categorization takes on a somewhat dif-
ferent color. The question is the extent to which we can anticipate 
the categories into which future factual situations will fall. If we 
knew what the future would bring, we could prescribe outcomes in 
advance for each of those cases. The judge would observe the facts 
as presented in court, pick those facts out of a list of factual set-
tings and prescribed results, and then announce the result that 
145. See also Farber, supra note 3, at 748-49. I presuppose some considerable strength 
for the general level of first amendment protection. If that level falls, however, it may be 
wise to consider the creation of subcategories of particularly strong protection. The founda-
tion for this has been laid in the Court's references to political speech as lying at the "core" 
of the first amendment. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 
(1978). See also Buchanan, supra note 78, at 557-59; Scanlon, supra note 78, at 537-42. 
146. See generally Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 Mo. L. REv. 387 (1979); 
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing 
Test, 76 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing 
Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972); Henkin, Infallibility 
Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1022 (1978). 
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corresponded with the facts. 
Because we cannot, of course, know what is to happen in the 
future, this solution will not work. Lacking the evidence to make 
maximally precise statements, we write our rules as generalizations 
rather than specifications. It is, however, still useful to look at this 
stylized conception of adjudication, because it guides us in the 
choices we must make with respect to the types of rules we wish to 
employ within the first amendment. The more we are able to antic-
ipate the future, the more possible it becomes to prescribe at the 
rulemaking level the outcomes we wish in each of the future 
cases.147 The problem develops when the unanticipated case arises, 
because the result in that case is likely to be less than ideal if the 
case must be forced into a category designed for something quite 
different. The problem in the Progressive case/"8 for example, is 
that those quite bizarre and unexpected facts just did not fit into a 
rule, derivable from Brandenburg and from the prior restraint 
cases, 149 that was designed for quite different circumstances. As we 
embody more of our particular visions of the future into categorial 
(which are not necessarily categorical1150) rules, we are more likely 
to find ourselves in trouble when the case that we did not antici-
147. We may not always wish to eliminate vagueness, but any identifiable vagueness is 
in theory eliminahle. Open texture, on the other hand, refers to that which we cannot fore· 
see and is therefore in theory never eliminable. Waismann, Verifiability, in LoGIC AND LAN-
GUAGE (FIRST SERIES) 117 (A.G.N. Flew ed. 1951). "Vagueness can be remedied by giving 
more accurate rules, but open texture cannot because we cannot predict future borderline 
cases." A. LACEY, A DICTIONARY OF PHn.OSOPHY 148 (1976). 
148. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), man-
damus denied sub. nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 
(7th Cir. 1979), was in reality clouded by controversy about the extent to which the material 
to be published was previously available to the public, and about the extent to which the 
material would or would not provide important and hitherto unknown (to the readers) infor-
mation for constructing a hydrogen bomb. For my purposes here these are irrelevant side 
issues, for it is now possible to foresee a case in which neither of these clouding factors 
would he present; i.e., when the publication of hitherto unknown and unavailable informa-
tion would provide information undeniably helpful to a hostile or unstable government pres-
ently in the process of attempting to construct a hydrogen bomb. 
149. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 
(1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 691 (1931). Even if one takes the doctrine of prior 
restraint as a given, that too was somewhat of a red herring. The important question is what 
could be done to The Progressive after publication, and when it could be done (i.e., upon 
publication?; upon evidence of the construction of a hydrogen bomb by Colonel Qadaffi?; or 
only upon detonation of a hydrogen bomb on American territory?). 
150. A categorial rule is one that deals with or in categories. A categorical rule is 
mandatory, or unconditionally incumbent, within its scope of application. Categorial rules 
may be more or less categorical, and categorical rules can occur regardless of the particular-
ity or generality of their ambit of application. 
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pate does not fit within the description of the category, or if the 
unanticipated case does fit within the existing verbal description of 
the category but does not produce a result that is at this time con-
sistent with our idea of what the result ought to be. 1111 
Thus, the Brandenburg test can be rephrased in categorial 
terms: If the act is directed toward and is likely to incite or pro-
duce imminent lawless action of significant magnitude, 1112 then 
deny protection; if the act lacks any one or more of these four fac-
tors-words of incitement, likely effect, imminence, great dan-
ger-then allow protection under the first amendment. This cat-
egorial rule is drawn on the assumption that if a speech act does 
not contain all of these elements, it could not present a threat 
great enough to outweigh the first amendment value in unfettered 
communication of matters relating to public issues. When, how-
ever, a case of the Progressive sort arises, we see that we were 
wrong. Lo and behold, cases in which one or more of those factors 
are absent1118 can present a threat so great that we wish to deny 
protection. Yet the rules do not accommodate the situation. The 
judge then has two choices. He can say that there are no words of 
incitement and perhaps no likely effect, and therefore allow protec-
tion, perhaps with disastrous results. Alternatively, he can change 
the rules (retroactively) to produce a desirable outcome in the case 
at hand.111~ 
The choice comes down to the amount of flexibility we wish to 
allow the judge to deal with a particular case whose existence we 
did not and quite possibly could not have foreseen. If we grant 
151. These two difficulties parallel Hart's "ignorance of fact" and "indeterminacy of 
aim." H.L.A. HART, supra note 41, at 125. 
152. The "significant magnitude" factor is derived from the opinion of Justice Bran-
deis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Whatever 
the defects and present status of the "gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability" 
standard of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), Dennis is the original source 
for presuming the "significant magnitude" factor to be implicit in any contemporary version 
of the clear and present danger test. See generally Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" 
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970); 
Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": from Schenck to Brandenburg-And 
Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 41. 
153. In Progressive there were certainly no words of incitement, probably no immi-
nence, and a somewhat lower probability of likelihood. 
154. The "prior restraint" posture of the Progressive case made it seemingly easier to 
decide the case, in large part because of the helpful "disclosure of troop movements" exam-
ple in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 691, 716 (1931). Prior restraint doctrine is, however, 
supposed to create an especially high standard of scrutiny, and it would be paradoxical if 
that standard were available to justify restrictions in cases in which Brandenburg was 
insufficient. 
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little or no flexibility, we increase the likelihood of anomalous re-
sults, the inevitable consequence of attempting to fit the unantici-
pated future into categories based on suppositions that did not in-
clude that event.155 We can, of course, accommodate the possibility 
of unanticipated future cases by granting greater flexibility to the 
judge, who can then look at how the interests are reflected in the 
particular case and reach what he perceives to be the proper ac-
commodation of those interests. 
This flexibility, though, entails two substantial costs. A prob-
lem of notice can occur because the more flexibility that the trial 
court has, the less certain anyone can be in advance of the likely 
result in a particular case.158 Lack of predictability in the law is 
always troublesome, and it is even more so when the inevitable 
caution that unpredictability yields will induce self-censorship 
("chilling") of that which may very well be important.157 Moreover, 
the judge might just decide incorrectly. The greater the flexibility 
that is built into the governing standards, the less the judge is con-
strained by rules even for the type of case we can anticipate. The 
less the judge is constrained, the more likely there are to be errant 
results. 
It is by now hardly a novel observation that particularized bal-
ancing of interests by the judge in respect to the case at hand (ad 
hoc balancing) is not a technique with a monopoly on the weighing 
of interests.158 We balance when we formulate rules for mechanical 
or categorical application. Nor is it a simple question of a choice 
between balancing at the rulemaking level or at the level of appli-
cation. There is a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. The question 
is not whether to permit judges to balance in the particular case, 
but rather how much authority the governing rule should allocate 
to the judge to take account of the particular circumstances of the 
case at hand. Although this allocation could take place in the form 
of a specific grant of authority, it is much more common for it to 
exist implicitly in the degree of specificity of the governing rule.159 
155. See G. GOTTLIEB, supra note 2, at 46; Hart, supra note 41, at 270. 
156. If we define "justice" here as reaching the optimally fair result in the individual 
case, we can describe the problem of discretion as the problem of accommodating the con-
flicting desiderata of certainty and justice. See Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DuKE L.J. 907, 
907. 
157. See Schauer, supra note 70. 
158. See authorities cited at note 36 supra; Fried, supra note 146. 
159. Generality and particularity in legal texts are verbal tools for allocating discre-
tion, power, and authority among legal agencies or persons in legal relationships to 
each other. In other words, roles and functions are assigned by the tightness or loose-
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When categorization is presented as a first amendment tech-
nique in opposition to balancing, what is in fact being advocated is 
the establishment of rules leaving little if any discretion to the 
judge in the particular case.160 The more a rule predetermines the 
outcome that flows from easily determinable facts, or the more a 
rule excludes certain facts from consideration by the judge, the less 
discretion is available to the judge and the more we can call the 
rule categorical.161 When a rule describes a category of facts with 
some specificity and when that rule mandates the results that flow 
from inclusion or exclusion from the specifically defined category, 
the judge has merely to place the case in the proper category in 
order to determine the correct result. Things will never be quite 
this simple, but it is possible to reduce or minimize the degree of 
discretion, although this comes at the cost of an increased propor-
tion of potentially nonideal results in cases unforeseen at the time 
the rule was formulated.162 In formulating a categorical rule, we 
isolate what we in our best judgment determine to be the facts on 
ness of language. An order, if vague, increases the discretion on the tier of authority 
below that of the giver of the order. 
Friedman, Law and Its Language, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 563, 573 {1964). 
160. See Ely, supra note 3, at 1490; Emerson, supra note 36, 68 CALIF. L. REv. at 429. 
161. Like most disputes about whether something is "really" this or "really'' that, the 
debate about whether the clear and present test is "really" a balancing test is quite tire-
some. To the extent that the requirements of clarity, immediacy, and magnitude of the 
danger constrain the exercise of particularized judgment in the individual case, there exists 
something different from free-wheeling or unconstrained balancing. To the extent that the 
vagueness of the terms and the variety of experience leave room for judicial discretion or 
manipulation, there exists something removed from a discretion-eliminating rigid categorical 
rule. I see little point in trying to say something more about the right label to be applied, as 
such disputes all too often deflect thought away from the difficult issues of evaluation 
involved. 
162. "It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human af-
fairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that 
hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always 
condemnable." 
J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 37 {1901). But cf.: 
It seetns, then, that with regard to any rule which is generally useful, we may assert 
that it ought always be observed, not on the ground that in every particular case it will 
be useful, but on the ground that in any particular case the probability of its being so 
is greater than that of our being likely to decide rightly that we have an instance of its 
disutility. In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should 
be broken, we can never know which the cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break 
it. 
G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 162-63 {1954). In the context of the first amendment, 
Moore's rule-governed approach has much to commend it, but only so long as we can live 
with the consequences of the occasional aberrant result that this approach must inevitably 
generate. Unfortunately, we cannot know in advance whether we can live with the conse-
quences of an aberrant result we cannot envisage. 
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which we wish and expect future cases to turn. In doing so we sup-
pose that these facts will recur and that they will recur in substan-
tially similar contexts-but we might be wrong. 
Perhaps the most extreme form of a categorical rule in first 
amendment doctrine is in the law of defamation. The court has 
"merely" to determine whether the plaintiff was a public figure or 
a public official and then apply the appropriate standard of culpa-
bility.163 This is by no means an easy task, 16" but the variability in 
what remains to be decided should not blind us to the extent to 
which issues have been removed from consideration in the particu-
lar case. All of the first amendment issues, for example, have been 
predetermined at the rulemaking leveJ.l65 It is not for the court in 
the particular case to determine whether the plaintiff has available 
adequate fora for a response, or if the particular words spoken are 
harmful or helpful to the process of public deliberation. Moreover, 
even the factual determinations are constrained by rule, at least to 
the extent that the concepts of "publicness" and "actual malice" 
have become more precise through a combination of rule language 
and interpretive case law. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are what have often been 
called content-neutral166 regulations of time, place, and manner,167 
whose permissibility turns on factors such as the availability of al-
ternative fora and the strength of the governmental interest.168 
These determinations involve bringing first amendment considera-
tions down to the level of application, a feature absent in the defa-
mation cases, and they also involve a relatively unconstrained ap-
proach to the determination of the relevant facts. 
Comparing these two extremes shows that locating the point 
163. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
164. See, e.g., Walston v. Rosder's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson 
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See generally 
Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Be-
yond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975). 
165. See Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Con-
traction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 458-69 (1977). 
166. I use "content-neutral" in its broadest sense, to refer to any governmental action 
whose aim is not the message or communicative impact of a particular utterance or class of 
utterances. The definition is broad enough to deny the content-neutrality of a total prohibi-
tion on all communication for the purpose of preventing an evil which is thought to fiow 
from the communicative impact of the conduct. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 232. 
167. Again, I refer to "time, place, and manner" only to comport with conventional 
terminology. The key is any governmental interest not based on communicative impact, a 
category substantially broader than "time, place, and manner." 
168. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 682-93. 
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between unfettered judicial discretion and mechanical application 
of categorical rules takes place not on one but on two planes. First, 
one must determine how much weighing of first amendment con-
cerns against countervailing governmental interests is to take place 
at the level of application.169 Second is the question of the extent 
to which the governing rules should channel the factual determina-
tion into relatively narrow observational categories. The two are of 
course related,I7° largely because selection of relevan_t facts always 
involves theory.171 Drawing the distinction, however, at least dem-
onstrates the complexity of the task. Thus, for example, Professor 
Ely's characterization of a determination based on the message it-
self (the words, with reference to context) without regard to proba-
ble effect as categorization172 is but an example of a rule that 
reduces the facts available for consideration in the individual case. 
This can be accomplished in many ways, and it seems inaccurate, 
or at least stipulative, to describe only one as "categorization." One 
could, after all, make the rule even more categorical in Professor 
Ely's own sense by increasing the specificity of the description of 
the words that are included within the category. There are as many 
different messages as there are combinations of words and con-
texts, and thus the characterization of a message as "incitement," 
for example, still involves an individualized assessment. This is not 
to say that important differences do not exist between an approach 
that turns on effect and an approach that does not. There are dif-
ferences. The mistake is in transposing a rough but useful classifi-
cation into a logical boundary. Similarly, allowing the considera-
tion of only some types of effect is in the same way more 
categorical than allowing the consideration of any effect.l73 
169. Id. at 583. 
170. "Thus a rule or principle may give us more or less rigid information as to the 
conditions under which it applies and as to the consequences it stipulates and this is so 
whether it consists of 'hard' descriptive terms or 'soft' evaluative terms." 
Tur, Principles and Rules, in PERSPECTIVES IN JuRISPRUDENCE 42, 60-61 (E. Attwooll ed. 
1977). 
171. See note 141 supra and accompanying text. 
172. Ely, supra note 3, at 1493 n.44. 
173. From a Kelsenian perspective we might say that the application of first amend-
ment norms to a particular case is the application of higher order norms. These higher order 
norms may, in the case of ad hoc balancing, be purely formal. They authorize the court in 
the particular case to create and to apply law without specifying the material content of the 
individual norm. Alternatively, the higher order norm can more or less specify the material 
content of the individual norm. The uncertainties of experience limit the extent of material 
authorization, but we can describe the extreme categorization first amendment technique as 
a maximum of content determinative material limitation. The first amendment is a frame 
that can be narrower or wider. Particularized adjudication takes place within this frame, 
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In seeking answers to these questions pertaining to the appro-
priate blend of guidance and discretion, it is important to remem-
ber that there is no necessary correlation between the approach 
employed and the strength of the first amendment protection.174 
Although ad hoc balancing has traditionally been associated with a 
puny first amendment and categorical rules with a powerful one, it 
could have been and still could be otherwise. It is possible, after 
all, to devise rigid rules that give little respect to free speech con-
siderations. Consider, for example, a rule that said no first amend-
ment protection was available when the speaker advocated viola-
tion of the law. What is or is not considered advocacy may in some 
cases be a close question. That is beside the point, however, for 
such a rule is substantially more categorical than the Brandenburg 
rule, which requires a contextual and therefore ad hoc determina-
tion of likely effect as well.175 Similarly, it could have been the case 
that all judges with the power to balance the interests in the par-
ticular case had, even with little guidance or restriction of their 
discretion, found in favor of the speaker and against the restric-
tion. If that had been our history, then the reflexive association of 
ad hoc balancing with limited first amendment protection might 
never have arisen. Ad hoc balancing gained its dismal first amend-
ment reputation in large part because its chief proponent, Justice 
Frankfurter, held as well a theory of great deference to legislative 
determinations.178 The two need not necessarily be conjoined. In-
deed, it is arguable, contrary to what some have held, 177 that 
judges are better at this type of balancing than legislatures, be-
cause only the judge has at hand the specific facts of the particular 
case. 
It is thus behavioral observation and speculation far more 
than inexorable logic that dictates the extent to which categorical 
rules should narrow the range of judicial choice. That does not 
mean, however, that we have nothing on which to base the choice. 
and the scope of the power of the court is determined by the size of the frame. See gener-
ally H. KELsEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw 245, 349 (1967); Paulson, Material and Formal 
Authorisation in Kelsen's Pure Theory, 39 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172 (1980); Tur, supra note 170, 
at 62-63. 
174. See Frantz, supra note 36, at 1440. 
175. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 233. 
176. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25, 542 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring); W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT 
119-20 (1961). 
177. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 66-67 (1958); W. MENDELSON, supra note 
176. 
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Experience can guide us, and in this respect the virtues of particu-
larized balancing are often quite hard to see. Freedom of speech is 
a long-term value not always fully appreciated in the case at 
hand.178 In order fully to accomodate this long-term interest, we 
must often make what at first sight appear to be discordant short-
term decisions. Moreover, as Professor Emerson has most notably 
reminded us, freedom of speech is a value that runs counter to 
many of our intuitions.179 Psychological forces, if there are such 
things, run in favor of suppression. In a particular case the as-
serted governmental interest will often look far more appealing or 
even compelling than the first amendment interest. As a result, it 
is not at all surprising that discretion-limiting rules have tradition-
ally provided far more in the way of first amendment protection 
than has particularized balancing. illustrative of this point are the 
obscenity cases, in which the intellectually appealing variable ob-
scenity approach180 (allowing more judicial consideration of con-
text than the more rigidly definitional Roth181-Memoirs182-Miller183 
approach) has produced such gems as Ginzburg, 184 Young, and 
Pacifica. 18~ 
This is not to say that the same approach to the constraints on 
and particularity of balancing must necessarily be employed 
throughout the first amendment. If there are to be subcategories 
within the first amendment, as there now are, then the reasons 
that prompted the creation of distinct subcategories will also often 
lead to different approaches to adjudicative style for the different 
subcategories.188 This is most plain in reference to the subcategory 
of time, place, and manner regulations, 187 in which the issues in-
volved must almost of necessity be evaluated on a case-by-case ba-
178. See Emerson, supra note 36, 72 YALE L.J. at 887-93. 
179. Id. 
180. The variable obscenity approach received its fullest articulation in Lockhart & 
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. 
REv. 5, 68-88 (1960). See also Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 
U. PA. L. REv. 834 (1964); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitu-
tional Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961). 
181. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
182. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See also text accompanying note 
106 supra. 
183. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
184. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
185. See Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 7; 
Schauer, supra note 101. 
186. See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 946-47. 
187. See note 166 supra. 
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sis.1ss It seems true as well for commercial speech, in which the 
complexity of the factual issues involved compels greater deference 
to administrative fact finding than would be permissible for most 
other forms of covered speech.1s9 
The choice of the appropriate point between unguided judicial 
discretion and rigid verbal rules, then, must be influenced not only 
by the balance between predictability and flexibility for unforeseen 
cases, but also by the psychological factors relating to the likely 
outcome of that discretion. It is a decision that takes place within 
a given first amendment subcategory. In turn, the decision to cre-
ate subcategories takes place within the process of delineating the 
category of coverage of the first amendment. Each categorization 
decision takes place within another, somewhat like those sets of 
Russian wooden dolls. Each categorization decision, like each doll, 
can stand alone if necessary, but the full impact is achieved in the 
way they all fit together. 
V. EPILOGUE: LEARNABILITY 
In the foregoing pages I have attempted to flesh out three dif-
ferent aspects of what has been broadly called "categorization." 
Implicit in this project is the premise that it is often quite re-
vealing to search for important differences in the face of superficial 
similarity. Very often, however, when we search for differences we 
may discover additional points of similarity that are not at first 
apparent. This seems to be the case here, in that one recurrent 
feature is what one mjght inelegantly call "learnability."190 
The concept of learnability is comprehensible only in the con-
text of a separation of roles.191 Thus, if the only question that 
arises in the context of the advocacy of a code-whether legal, 
moral, or otherwise-is whether it is substantially good or bad, we 
need not be concerned with whether someone else can learn it. 
That is, however, an artificially truncated view of codes, for codes 
must in fact be applied to new situations by persons other than the 
ones who create or promulgate the code. The code must be capable 
of application by those who must apply it if it is to be called, in a 
188. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 584. 
189. See text accompanying note 121 supra. 
190. See Hare, Principles, 73 PRoc. AmsT. Soc. 1, 12-14 (1973) ("teachability"); Tria-
nosky, Rule-Utilitarianism and the Slippery Slope, 75 J. PHIL. 414, 421 (1978) (codes must 
be "learnable"). 
191. See Trianosky, supra note 190, at 418-19 (slippery slope arguments irrelevant in 
terms of a person who accepts a complete code). 
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larger sense, a "satisfactory" code. 
In the context of constitutional adjudication, the question is 
whether a code-that is, a system of rules, principles, exceptions, 
and so on-can adequately be articulated by the Supreme Court 
and whether the code so articulated is then "learnable" by those 
judges and prosecutors at the level of application who have the 
major burden of responsibility in putting the code into practice. If 
the code is not fully "learnable," then we must look closer at the 
type of leakage that takes place between the formulation of the 
ideal code and its subsequent application. 
Numerous justifications are given for a principle of freedom of 
speech. Because there are an infinite number of contexts in which 
speech can take place and because an infinite number of things can 
be done with language, the variety of speech may intersect in an 
infinite number of ways with the reasons behind a governmental 
regulation. Were we not concerned with learnability, we would at-
tempt to fashion a complex code enabling us to deal adequately 
with all of the variations presented by particular cases. Every rele-
vant and justifiable distinction, no matter how fine, would be built 
into the code. The resultant code would be a complex structure of 
broad principles, specific rules, detailed exceptions, and elaborate 
connecting relationships. Since we have assumed that each distinc-
tion is in itself justifiable in the theory, the only objection to such 
a code-and it is a conclusive objection-is that it would not work. 
"Certain very complex codes break down because ordinary people 
just can't keep all the distinctions, caveats, and exceptions straight 
in their heads. "191 
Faced with this psychological phenomenon, which is com-
pounded here by the fact that freedom of speech is itself so 
counter-intuitive that errors will most often be on the side of re-
pression rather than permission, 198 we must abandon codes of great 
sophistication and consequent complexity in favor of simpler or 
more general codes.1" We must sacrifice the advantages of dealing 
with the full variety of cases in optimum fashion in order to 
achieve the advantages, in terms of learnability, of general princi-
ples. We accomplish this by creating general or larger categories 
192. Id. at 421. 
193. See L. 'l'RmE, supra note 3, at 576-84; Emerson, supra note 36, 72 YALE L.J. at 
887-93. 
194. "Simplicity in principles often goes with generality; it is usually possible to ex-
press more general principles in fewer words than less general ones; but this is not always 
the case •••• " Hare, supra note 190, at 3. 
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when ideally we might deal in smaller categories and finer distinc-
tions. There is nothing unseemly about this, for a fully developed 
theory must incorporate the realities of applying that theory.1911 
From this perspective we can understand the strong impetus 
in favor of the creation of large categories in the first amendment, 
an impetus that pervades each of the three faces of categorization I 
have discussed. The risk of misapplication of a general category of 
coverage leads us to define the category of coverage as broadly as 
possible, indeed somewhat more broadly than any underlying the-
ory of free speech would warrant.198 The risk of misapplication of 
numerous subcategories leads us to eschew subcategories within 
the first amendment, avoiding them even when a distinction seems 
justifiable. The risk of misapplication in individual cases, more-
over, leads us to favor categorical rules over ad hoc balancing, even 
at the cost of recognizing important differences among individual 
cases. None of these choices is absolute. They are presumptions 
that may be overcome. Indeed, the presumptions ought ideally to 
get weaker as time goes by. The more that judges, prosecutors, and 
legislators become familiar with the full import and complexity of 
first amendment theory, the more it should be possible to go on 
and create smaller categories and finer distinctions, recognizing the 
theoretically significant differences that we now for good reason ig-
nore. Learning is slow, but it is at least hopefully progressive. The 
end of this process, however, is a long way off.197 Until we reach or 
even come close to this utopia, general categories are the most im-
portant way we have of incorporating the constitutionally man-
dated preference for free speech values into a legal system popu-
lated by human beings of less than perfect ability and less than 
perfect insight. 
195. See I. KANT, ON THE OLD SAw: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WoN'T 
WoRK IN PRACTICE (E.B. Ashton trans. 1974). 
196. It is a possible but not a necessary truth that the use of larger categories will 
increase the proportion of troublesome cases. An increase in generality need not carry with 
it an increase in vagueness. Some very general words, such as "insect," are indeed quite 
determinate. 
197. Unfortunately, I have no great confidence that we are even heading in the right 
direction. The actions of some prosecutors and trial judges in first amendment cases, if not 
the occasion for total despair, are at least cause to wonder whether we (the legal establish-
ment) are not much better at formulating rules than we are at either teaching the rules or 
teaching the values that support them. 

